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We can distinguish two sorts of consequentialist theories of rational choice.
On one side are expected value theory, conditional expected value theory,
minimax, maximin, and other forms of rational monism. On the other side
are various forms of rational pluralism, none of which enjoy much familiarity.
Rational monism is more commonly defended. But I believe that consequen-
tialists should favor rational pluralism.
1 Rational Monism v. Rational Pluralism
The dispute between rational monists and rational pluralists is a dispute
about an analogical claim in metaethics. To put the analogical claim in its
proper context, it will be helpful to remind ourselves about consequentialism
and its reductive ambitions.
According to consequentialism, the realization of value is all that funda-
mentally matters.1 The deontic, therefore, is reducible: every normatively
significant deontic notion somehow reduces to facts about value and its real-
ization.
There are at least two parts to the reductive task facing consequentialists
because there are at least two normatively significant deontic notions. There
1See e.g. Bentham (1961[1789]), Mill (1988[1861]), Moore (1903;1912) and Ramsey
(1990[1926]).
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is objective permission and also rational (sometimes called ‘subjective’) per-
mission.2 The distinction between the two is made vivid by examples like
the following:
Boxes like Miners. There are three opaque boxes, arranged left-
to-right. The agent must choose exactly one. The agent knows
that the middle box contains $9. Of the other two boxes, she
knows that one contains $0 and that the other contains $10. But
she is uncertain which box contains $10, and divides her credence
equally between the two possibilities. (In fact, the right box con-
tains $10.)
An agent facing Boxes like Miners is objectively required to take the right
box and rationally required to take the middle box.
An adequate consequentialist reduction of objective permission is already
at hand. According to consequentialists, whenever an agent faces a decision,
each of the agent’s options has an actual value, and objective permission
reduces to actual value maximization. Actual value maximization is not
just necessarily coextensive with objective permission; according to conse-
quentialists, it’s prior. Whenever an option is objectively permissible, it is
so because it maximizes actual value. For example, in Boxes like Miners,
if we equate dollars and units of value, the actual values of choosing the
left, middle, and right boxes are, respectively, 0, 9, and 10. And according
to consequentialists, that’s what makes choosing the right box objectively
required.
Reducing rational permission is harder. I will assume that the reduction
takes the same basic shape: that, whenever an option is rationally permis-
sible, it is so because it maximizes some quantity.3 But the hard-to-answer
2The claim that there are both objective and rational permissions is not entirely un-
controversial; see e.g. [redacted], Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), and Thomson (2008).
3For reasons discussed in §5.3, it is the stable maximization, not themere maximization,
of a quantity that makes options rationally permissible.
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question remains: what quantity, or quantities, feature in the reduction?
What makes options rationally permissible?
It’s here that rational monists and rational pluralists disagree. According
to rational monists, some quantity stands to rational permission as actual
value stands to objective permission. Actual value is the universal objective-
maker : objective permissions always reduce to the maximization of actual
value. According to rational monists, some special quantity Q is the universal
rational-maker : rational permissions always reduce to the maximization of
it.
Of course, rational monists disagree about what the universal rational-
maker is. Some think it’s expected value.4 Others think it’s conditional
expected value,5 or maximin value,6 or risk-adjusted expected value.7 But
they agree that some quantity is the universal rational-maker.
According to rational pluralists, no quantity stands to rational permission
as actual value stands to objective permission.8 Consequentialism is true.
Whenever an option is rationally permissible, it’s made so by maximizing
some quantity. But no quantity is the universal rational-maker. On one
occasion it might be the maximization of Q1 that makes options rationally
permissible; on another occasion it might be the maximization of Q2 that
makes options rationally permissible, in which case the Q1-values of options
will have no bearing on what the agent is rationally permitted to choose.
The essay below has a negative part and a positive part. The negative
part is contained in §§2–4. By combining some recent work in decision theory
with some metaethical considerations, I will argue against rational monism.
The positive part is contained in §§5–7. Many forms of rational pluralism are
4See e.g. Hammond (1988), Joyce (1999; 2012; 2018), Lewis (1981), von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), Pettigrew (2015), Ramsey (1990[1926]), Savage (1954), Skyrms
(1982; 1984; 1990), Sobel (1994), and Stalnaker (1981).
5See e.g. Ahmed (2014a), Eells (1982), and Jeffrey (1965; 1983).
6See e.g. Rawls (1971).
7See e.g. Buchak (2013).
8There are other rational pluralists; see e.g. Robinson (dissertation) and Weirich (1988;
2004).
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messy and unsystematic. But the form of rational pluralism that I develop
is principled. I believe that what makes a quantity a rational-maker on
a given occasion is being the best quantity that can guide the agent on
that occasion. I take quantities to be mathematical objects: functions from
decision problems to functions from world-option pairs to real numbers. I
will propose a way of scoring these quantities; I will put forward conditions
that a quantity must meet in order to be capable of guiding a given agent
on a given occasion; and I will argue that the rational-maker on a given
occasion is the highest-scoring quantity that can guide the agent on that
occasion. The form of rational pluralism that I develop arises naturally from
this constrained optimization conception of occasional rational-making.
2 Two Rules for Reducing
Consequentialists ultimately need a reduction of rational permission that
holds true for all agents, ideal and nonideal. As I will point out in the final
section, it’s very unlikely that any form of rational monism holds true both
for ideal and nonideal agents. But many philosophers are inclined to think
that some form of rational monism holds true for ideal agents. So, for now,
let’s set nonideal agents aside, and focus exclusively on ideal agents, who
have unlimited powers of introspection and deduction.
The dispute between rational monists and rational pluralists (concerning
ideal agents) can be made more precise by appealing to some familiar formal-
ism. In the usual way, let’s represent an (ideal) agent facing a decision with a
decision problem, which we’ll take to be an ordered quadruple, 〈C, u,A,K〉.
The first coordinate, C, is the agent’s credence function, a probability
function that represents the agent’s confidence in each proposition. Here
and throughout, I assume the realist view that credences are among the
agent’s fundamental psychological states.9
9For more on the dispute between instrumental and realist views of credences, see e.g.
Eriksson and Háyek (2007), List and Dietrich (2016), and Pettigrew (2019).
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The second coordinate, u, is the agent’s utility function, which maps each
possible world to a real number and thereby represents the degree to which
the agent finds the world desirable. I will assume the same realist view of
utilities that I assume of credences.
The third coordinate, A = {a1, a2, ..., an}, is the set of options, which are
propositions that the agent can make true by deciding. I will assume that
options are pairwise exclusive.
The fourth and final coordinate, K = {k1, k2, ..., km}, is the set of depen-
dency hypotheses, which are propositions that fully specify how things do and
do not depend causally on the agent’s decision.10 I will assume that depen-
dency hypotheses are pairwise exclusive and compossible with each option.
Taken as a whole, a decision problem d = 〈C, u,A,K〉 represents an
(ideal) agent of type 〈C, u〉 facing a decision of type 〈A,K〉.
If D is the set of decision problems, then consequentialists, on account of
their reductive ambitions, are committed to two metaethical functions that
have D as their domain.
The first is the rule for reducing objective permission, a function that maps
each decision problem to the quantity the maximization of which makes op-
tions objectively permissible relative to that decision problem. In principle,
a dispute between monists and pluralists could arise here. Objective monists
would claim that the rule for reducing objective permission is a constant
function, and objective pluralists would disagree. But I will ignore this dis-
pute and assume, here and throughout, that the rule for reducing objective
permission maps every decision problem to actual value.
The second is the rule for reducing rational permission, a function that
maps each decision problem to the quantity the maximization of which makes
options rationally permissible relative to that decision problem. This is the
function that gives precision to the dispute between rational monists and
rational pluralists (concerning ideal agents). Rational monists believe that
this function is constant, and rational pluralists, like me, disagree.
10Cf. Lewis (1981) and Skyrms (1982).
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It is worth pausing here to say more precisely what I take quantities to
be. Most of the important examples will be familiar. But let me offer an
abstract characterization.11
Let W = {w1, w2, ..., wi} be the set of possible worlds, and, for simplicity,
assume that W is finite. A mathematical quantity is any function that maps
decision problems to functions that map option-world pairs to real numbers.
In other words, if Z is a mathematical quantity and d = 〈C, u,A,K〉, then Z
maps d to some function that maps each 〈a, w〉 to a real number. Mathemat-
ical quantities are then partitioned into quantities by their maximizational
structure. If Z is mathematical quantity, let Max(Z,w, d) be the set of op-
tions that maximize Z at 〈w, d〉. Two mathematical quantities, Z1 and Z2,
are equivalent, then, just if, for any 〈w, d〉, Max(Z1, w, d) =Max(Z2, w, d).
More simply, then, a quantity can be thought of as a function that maps
each 〈w, d〉 to the set of options that maximize the quantity relative to 〈w, d〉.
Given this abundant conception of quantities, it is almost uncontroversial
that some quantity is necessarily coextensive with rational permission—see
§4.3. But what we seek is a consequentialist reduction of rational permis-
sion, and necessary coextensiveness does not suffice for reduction. If rational
monism (concerning ideal agents) is true, then some quantity, in the sense
above, is such that: whenever an (ideal) agent faces a decision, it is the
maximization of that quantity that makes options rationally permissible.
3 Independent Monism
3.1 V -monism and U-monism
The two most commonly defended forms of rational monism are V -monism
(sometimes called ‘conditional expected value theory’ or ‘evidential decision
theory’) and U -monism (sometimes called ‘expected value theory’ or ‘causal
decision theory’). Both V and U can be defined in terms of actual value,
11This characterization assumes that we have set nonideal agents aside.
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which, itself, can be defined using the formalism above.
Since dependency hypotheses fully specify how things the agent cares
about do and do not depend causally on the agent’s decision, the actual
value of an option depends only on which dependency hypothesis holds. Let
ak be the conjunction of option a and dependency hypothesis k. Every ak-
world has the same utility, so, if w is an ak-world, u(ak) = u(w).
The V -value of a—i.e., the conditional expected value of a—is the agent’s
expectation of the actual value of a, conditional on a:
V (a) =
∑
K C(k|a)u(ak).
According to V -monists, the rule for reducing rational permission maps every
decision problem to V .
The U-value of a—i.e., the expected value of a—is the agent’s (uncondi-
tional) expectation of the actual value a:
U(a) =
∑
K C(k)u(ak).
According to U -monists, the rule for reducing rational permission maps every
decision problem to U .
Both V -monism and U -monism face challenges. Newcomb problems chal-
lenge V -monism, and unstable problems—such as Bostrom’s (2001) Meta-
Newcomb, Egan’s (2007) Psychopath Button, and Ahmed’s (2014b) Dicing
with Death—challenge U -monism.12 And as we will see in §3.4, if both chal-
lenges succeed—if Newcomb problems are counterexamples to V -monism and
unstable problems are counterexamples to U -monism—then many forms of
rational monism that otherwise might have seemed promising can be shown
to be extensionally inadequate.
12Other discussions of Newcomb problems and/or unstable problems include: [redacted],
Ahmed (2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2018), Artnzenius (2008), Bales (2018), Bassett (2015), Briggs
(2010), Eells (1982), Eells and Harper (1991), Gallow (MS), Gibbard and Harper (1978),
Gustafsson (2011), Hare and Hedden (2016), Horgan (1981), Hunter and Richter (1978),
Jeffrey (1983), Joyce (1999; 2012; 2018), Lewis (1981), Nozick (1969), Oddie and Menzies
(1992), Rabinowicz (1988; 1999), Skyrms (1982; 1984; 1990), Stalnaker (1981), Wedgwood
(2013), Weirich (1985; 1988; 2004), and Wells (forthcoming).
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3.2 Newcomb Problems
Given the set of dependency hypotheses, we can define strict K-domination:
option ai strictly K-dominates option aj, relative to credence function C, just
if every k to which C assigns nonzero probability is such that u(aik) > u(ajk).
Two principles that connect strict K-domination and rational choice then
suggest themselves. The first is stronger:
K-Elimination: If, relative to an agent’s credence function, op-
tion ai strictly K-dominates option aj, then it is not rationally
permissible for the agent to choose option aj.
The second is weaker:
K-Selection: If, relative to an agent’s credence function, op-
tion ai strictly K-dominates every other option, then the agent
is rationally required to choose option ai.
In Newcomb’s problems, V -monism violates both:
Newcomb. There is a transparent box and an opaque box. The
agent has two options. She can take only the opaque box, or
she can take both boxes (a1 or a2). The transparent box con-
tains $1,000. The opaque box contains either $0 or $1,000,000,
depending on a prediction made yesterday by a reliable predictor.
If the predictor predicted that the agent would take both boxes,
the opaque box contains $0. If the predictor predicted that the
agent would take only the opaque box, the opaque box contains
$1,000,000. The agent knows all of this.
Taking both boxes strictly K-dominates taking only the opaque box, and
thus strictly K-dominates every other option. But V -monism recommends
taking only the opaque box:
8
V (a1) ≈ (0)(0)+(1)(1, 000, 000) = 1, 000, 000 > V (a2) ≈ (1)(1, 000)+
(0)(1, 001, 000) = 1, 000.
I am convinced that an agent facing Newcomb is rationally required to
take both boxes, so I reject V -monism.13
3.3 Unstable Problems
But U -monism also faces a challenge. We can distinguish stable and unstable
decision problems. If C is an agent’s credence function, let Ca be the agent’s
credence function conditional on a. A decision problem d = 〈C, u,A,K〉 is
stable just if some a ∈ A maximizes U both relative to d and relative to
da = 〈Ca, u, A,K〉, and unstable, otherwise. Some unstable problems appear
to be counterexamples to U -monism. For example:14
The Frustrater. There is an envelope and two opaque boxes, A
and B. The agent has three options. She can take box A, box B,
or the envelope (aA, aB, or aE). The envelope contains $40. The
two boxes together contain $100. How the money is distributed
between the boxes depends on a prediction made yesterday by
the Frustrater, a reliable predictor who seeks to frustrate. If the
Frustrater predicted that the agent would take box A, box B
contains $100. If the Frustrater predicted that the agent would
take box B, box A contains $100. If the Frustrater predicted that
the agent would take the envelope, each box contains $50. The
agent knows all of this.
If we equate dollars and units of value, then, no matter what the agent’s
credences are, U(aE) = 40 and U(aA) + U(aB) = 100. So, no matter what
the agent’s credences are, aA and/or aB maximize U . But there is a strong
13For a defense of two-boxing, see [redacted].
14This example is from [redacted]. It’s assumed that the agent is unable to randomize
their choice.
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intuition that an agent facing The Frustrater is rationally required to take
the envelope, and that intuition is undergirded by an argument that I find
compelling.15
Unstable problems do not only challenge U -monism; they also challenge
K-domination principles. The weaker principle, K-Selection, is safe and
should be accepted. But the stronger principle, K-Elimination, is challenged
by examples like the following:16
The Semi-Frustrater. There are two opaque boxes, one white
and one black. The agent has four options. She can point to
either box with either hand (aRW , aLW , aRB, or aLB). One of the
boxes contains $0; the other contains $100. The agent receives
whichever box she points to. Which box contains which sum de-
pends on a prediction made yesterday by the Semi-Frustrater, a
predictor who seeks to frustrate. If the Semi-Frustrater predicted
that the agent would point to the black box, the white box con-
tains $100. If the Semi-Frustrater predicted that the agent would
point to the white box, the black box contains $100. There are
two left-right asymmetries. First, the agent will receive an extra
$5 if she points to a box with her right hand. Second, because the
Semi-Frustrater scans only half of the agent’s brain (the half that
controls motor movement on the right-hand side of the body),
the Semi-Frustrater is a 90%-reliable predictor of right-handed
box-pointings and only a 50%-reliable predictor of left-handed
box-pointings. The agent knows all of this.
Each right-handed option strictly K-dominates the corresponding left-
handed option. The two relevant dependency hypotheses are kW , the propo-
sition that the white box contains $100, and kB, the proposition that the
black box contains $100, and:
15See [redacted].
16This example is from [redacted].
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u(aLWkW ) = 100 < 105 = u(aRWkW );
u(aLWkB) = 0 < 5 = u(aRWkB);
u(aLBkW ) = 0 < 5 = u(aRBkW ); and
u(aLBkB) = 100 < 105 = u(aRBkB).
But there is a strong intuition that the rationally permissible options are
the left-handed options. I am compelled by this intuition, so I reject both
U -monism and K-Elimination.
3.4 Against Independent Monism
One can always bite the bullet. An inveterate V -monist might insist that
an agent facing Newcomb is rationally required to take only the opaque box,
and an inveterate U -monist might insist that an agent facing The Frustrater
is not rationally permitted to take the envelope.17 But whether we want
to go in for this sort of bullet-biting depends in part on how attractive the
intuition-accommodating alternatives are. So I propose that we provisionally
take the intuitions at face value, and thus take V -monism and U -monism to
stand refuted.
If we do so, we can prove an important limitative result.18 Say that a
quantity is independent if its comparative relations holds independently of
alternatives. Height is an example. If x and y are two people in a room and
x is taller than y, then x continues to be taller than y, no matter who enters
or exits the room.
When an object maximizes an independent quantity, it continues to do
so upon the elimination of alternatives. If x is the tallest person in the room,
she continues to be tallest, no matter who else exits the room.
17For an inveterate defense of V -monism, see e.g. Ahmed (2014a). For an inveterate
defense of U -monism, see e.g. Harper (1996) and Joyce (2012; 2018).
18The proof draws on Ahmed (2012).
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Most familiar quantities—height, mass, age, wealth, velocity, brightness,
actual value, U , and V , just to mention a few—are independent quanti-
ties, and almost every form rational monism on offer is centered on some
independent quantity or other. But given two principles that connect strict
K-domination to rational choice, we can prove that rational permission is
not coextensive with the maximization of any independent quantity. The
principles are K-Selection, the weaker of the K-domination principles above,
and:
K-Permission: It is sometimes rationally permissible for an
agent to choose an option that is strictly K-dominated relative
to the agent’s credence function.
The motivation for K-Permission comes from cases like The Semi-Frustrater.
The proof is then straightforward. Take any example in which an agent is
rationally permitted to choose an option that is strictlyK-dominated relative
to the agent’s credence function. For instance, take The Semi-Frustrater. If
Q-monism is true, then, since the left-handed options are rationally permis-
sible, Q(aLW ) and Q(aLB) are equal to one another and exceed both Q(aRW )
and Q(aRB).
Now eliminate all but two of the agent’s options, keeping a K-dominated
option that is rationally permissible and an option that K-dominates it. For
example,
The Demi-Semi-Frustrater. Everything is as in The Semi-Frustrater,
except that the agent cannot point to the black box.
If Q is independent, then, relative to the The Demi-Semi-Frustrater, Q(aLW )
exceeds Q(aRW ). Hence, according to Q-monism, the agent facing The Demi-
Semi-Frustrater is rationally required to point left-handedly. But this claim
contradicts K-Selection, since, in The Demi-Semi-Frustrater, pointing right-
handedly to the white box strictly K-dominates every other option.19
19The Demi-Semi-Frustrater is just another Newcomb problem.
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It follows, then, that rational permission is not coextensive with Q-
maximization. And since Q was chosen arbitrarily, the conclusion gener-
alizes. If K-Permission and K-Selection are both true, rational permission
is not coextensive with the maximization of any independent quantity.
This limitative result can be stated more clearly with the help of some
terminology. Call any form of rational monism centered on an independent
quantity, an independent monism. Every independent monism verifies:
Alpha: For any decision problem d = 〈C, u,A,K〉, if a ∈ A is
rationally permissible relative to d, and a ∈ A′ ⊂ A, then a is
rationally permissible relative to d′ = 〈C, u,A′, K〉.20
Our limitative result, then, is this: Alpha is false, and hence every form of
independent monism is extensionally inadequate. If we take the intuitions
about Newcomb problems and unstable problems at face value, then the only
hope for rational monism is some form of dependent monism.
4 Dependent Monism
4.1 V -ratificationism
The most familiar theory that falsifies Alpha is V -ratificationism.21
Let’s say that option a is ratifiable, relative to decision problem d =
〈C, u,A,K〉, just if a maximizes U relative to da = 〈Ca, u, A,K〉, and non-
ratifiable, otherwise. According to V -ratificationism, options are lexically
ordered by ratifiability, and then ranked by V -value. Hence, if any option is
ratifiable, the rationally permissible options are the options that maximize
V among the ratifiable options, and if no option is ratifiable, the rationally
permissible options are the options that maximize V, simpliciter.
20Cf. Sen (1970).
21Cf. Jeffrey (1983).
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There are different ways to understand V -ratificationism, but we’ll un-
derstand it as a particular form of dependent monism.22 The math here isn’t
important, but let me lay it out anyway. We can bound and normalize the
V -values of options by taking their arctangent and dividing by pi. We can
then add a ratifiability score: if a is ratifiable (relative to d = 〈C, u,A,K〉)
then let r(a) = 1
2
, and if a is nonratifiable (relative to d) then let r(a) = −1
2
.
We then can define the J-value of option a (relative to d) as follows:
J(a) = tan
−1(V (a))
pi
+ r(a).
The J-values of nonratifiable options lie on the open interval (−1, 0) and are
ordered by their V -values, and the J-values of ratifiable options lie on the
open interval (0, 1) and are ordered by their V -values. Hence, so long as we
care only about the ordinal rankings of options in terms of choiceworthiness,
we can take V -ratificationism to be J-monism.
There are some familiar virtues of V -ratificationism. Unlike any form
of independent monism, V -ratificationism validates both K-Selection and
K-Permission.23 Moreover, it gives the correct verdicts in all of the cases
above: two-boxing in Newcomb, pointing right-handedly in The Demi-Semi-
Frustrater, taking the envelope in The Frustrater, and pointing left-handedly
in The Semi-Frustrater.
But V -ratificationism also has some vices. It admits of counterexam-
ples and—like every form of dependent monism, I think—is metaethically
dubious. The metaethical vice is more important, but let’s start with a
counterexample.
4.2 A Counterexample to V -ratificationism
V -ratificationism predicts that ratifiable options are always more choicewor-
thy than nonratifiable options. But that prediction is wrong, as the following
22We can also formulate V -ratificationism as a form of rational pluralism. The monistic
and pluralistic formulations of V -ratificationism do not differ extensionally, but they differ
metaethically—see §4.3.
23If an option K-dominates every other option, then it is the only ratifiable option.
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example, adapted from Skyrms (1984), makes clear:
Three Shells. There are three shells, A, B, and C. The agent
must choose exactly one (aA, aB, or aC). How much money is
contained in each shell depends on a prediction made yesterday
by a reliable predictor. If the predictor predicted that the agent
would choose shell A, then A contains $5, B contains $0, and
C contains $0. If the predictor predicted that the agent would
choose shell B, then A contains $0, B contains $9, and C contains
$10. If the predictor predicted that the agent would choose shell
C, then A contains $0, B contains $10, and C contains $9. The
agent knows all of this.
Choosing shell A is the only ratifiable option. Hence, according to V -
ratificationism, an agent facing Three Shells is rationally required to choose
A, no matter what credences she has. But that’s wrong. If the agent is confi-
dent that she will choose A, then she is rationally required to choose A, since
she’s then confident that A contains $5 and that the other two shells contain
$0. But if the agent is not confident that she will choose shell A, it’s not even
rationally permissible for her to do so. Contra V -ratificationism, ratifiable
options are not, merely by virtue of being ratifiable, more choiceworthy than
nonratifiable options.
4.3 Other Forms of Dependent Monism
There are other forms of dependent monism on offer. Wedgwood (2013)
defends what we might call B-monism, where:
B(a) =
∑
K(C(k|a)(u(ak)−
∑
A
u(ak)
#A
)).
Gallow (MS) defends what we might G-monism, where:
G(ai) = −1× (maxaj∈A(
∑
K C(k|ai)u(ajk))−
∑
K C(k|ai)u(aik)).
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Neither makes much progress over V -ratificationism: Three Shells is a coun-
terexample to both.24
But examples and counterexamples can only get us so far. V -ratificationism
(a.k.a. J-monism), B-monism, and G-monism are just three forms of depen-
dent monism. There are uncountably many others. And given optimism—the
claim, which I accept,25 that there is a determinate fact of the matter about
which options are rationally permissible relative to every 〈w, d〉—we can con-
struct an extensionally adequate form of dependent monism as follows:
Let g be a function that maps each decision problem to the
set of world-option pairs that are rationally permissible. Hence,
〈a, w〉 ∈ g(d) if and only if a is rationally permissible at 〈w, d〉.
Let a mathematical quantity, Zg, be defined as follows. If 〈a, w〉 ∈
24In Three Shells, no matter what the agent’s credences are:
B(aA) =
∑
K(C(k|aA)(u(ak)−
∑
A
u(ak)
#A )) ≈ (1)(5− 53 )+(0)(0− 193 )+(0)(0−
19
3 ) =
10
3 ;
B(aB) =
∑
K(C(k|aB)(u(ak) −
∑
A
u(ak)
#A )) ≈ (0)(0 − 53 ) + (1)(9 − 193 ) +
(0)(10− 193 ) = 83 .
B(aC) =
∑
K(C(k|aC)(u(ak) −
∑
A
u(ak)
#A )) ≈ (0)(0 − 53 ) + (0)(10 − 193 ) +
(1)(9− 193 ) = 83 ; and
Following Gallow (MS), let E(ai|aj) =
∑
K C(k|aj)u(ai). Then G(ai) = −1 ×
(maxaj∈AE(aj |ai) − E(ai|ai)). In Three Shells, no matter what the agent’s credences
are: E(aA|aA) ≈ 5, E(aA|aB) ≈ 0, E(aA|aC) ≈ 0, E(aB |aA) ≈ 0, E(aB |aB) ≈ 9,
E(aB |aC) ≈ 10, E(aC |aA) ≈ 0, E(aC |aB) ≈ 10, and E(aC |aC) ≈ 9. Hence
G(aA) ≈ −1× (5− 5) = 0;
G(aB) ≈ −1× (10− 9) = −1; and
G(aC) ≈ −1× (10− 9) = −1.
25The most sustained argument against optimism is Briggs’ (2010). Briggs argues that
any adequate decision theory must verify two principles—a Pareto principle and a self-
sovereignty principle—and then proves that no decision theory can verify both . I think
that an adequate decision theory must falsify both: the Pareto principle is refuted by The
Semi-Frustrater, and the self-sovereignty principle is refuted by Three Shells.
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g(d), then Zg(d)(〈a, w〉) = 1, and if 〈a, w〉 /∈ g(d), then Zg(d)(〈a, w〉) =
0. If Qg is the quantity that contains Zg, then Qg-maximization
is coextensive with rational permission.
We can also construct any number of extensionally adequate forms of rational
pluralism.
The disagreement between an extensionally adequate form of dependent
monism and an extensionally adequate form of rational pluralism is real.
Dependent monists claim that some dependent quantity is the universal
rational-maker. Rational pluralists deny that any quantity is the univer-
sal rational-maker, and many rational pluralists will insist that options are
always made rationally permissible by some independent quantity or other.
But the disagreement cannot be settled merely by appeal to examples and
counterexamples.
4.4 The Problem of Consequentialist Credentials
Instead, the disagreement is to be settled on metaethical grounds.
A consequentialist who claims that it is the maximization of Q that makes
options rationally permissible relative to decision problem d must be able to
provide a consequentialist explanation for why it is the maximization of Q,
specifically, and not some other quantity, that makes options rationally per-
missible. We are owed some story about how we get from consequentialism—
the claim that the realization of value is all that fundamentally matters—to
the claim that Q-maximization is what makes options rationally permissible
relative to d. We can call this explanatory task, the problem of consequen-
tialist credentials. My reason for favoring rational pluralism over dependent
monism is that I think it’s better positioned to answer the problem of con-
sequentialist credentials.
The usual way of trying to answer the problem of consequentialist creden-
17
tials is by proving a representation theorem.26,27 In a representation theorem,
some formal conditions are identified and alleged to be requirements on ra-
tional choice. It is proved that, if the formal conditions identified really are
requirements on rational choice, then rational permission is coextensive with
the maximization of some quantity. And those with reductive ambitions then
go on to claim that rational permission reduces to the maximization of that
quantity. Consequentialists who respond to the problem of consequential-
ist credentials by proving a representation theorem inevitably are lead to
rational monism. The whole point of proving a representation theorem is
to arrive at a representing quantity: that is, a quantity the maximization
of which is coextensive with rational permission relative to every decision
problem. And all of the familiar representation theorems lead to some form
of independent monism, since, in each case, the identified conditions entail
Alpha.28 (The importance of the limitative result above thus becomes ap-
parent. A proof that Alpha is false is, inter alia, a proof that none of the
familiar representation theorems succeed.)
The problem of consequentialist credentials is an acute problem for de-
pendent monism because, as the normative complexity of the quantity that
is alleged to be the universal rational-maker increases, so too does the diffi-
culty of exhibiting its consequentialist credentials. It is one thing to try to
explain why U—i.e., expected value—should be the universal rational-maker.
26Some representative quotations:
The fundamental source for the normative force of expected utility theory
lies in what are known as representation theorems... (Bermúdez 2009: 30).
The standard method for justifying any version of expected utility theory
involves proving a representation theorem... (Joyce 1999: 4).
For an alternative way of trying to answer the problem of consequentialists credentials,
see Hammond (1988).
27For an orthogonal critique of using representation theorems to answer the problem of
consequentialist credentials, see Meacham and Weisberg (2011).
28The familiar representation theorems include: Bolker (1967), Buchak (2013), Joyce
(1999), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Savage (1954).
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It is another thing entirely to try to explain why, say, J—i.e., the quotient of
the arctangent of conditional expected value and pi plus a ratifiability score—
should be the universal rational-maker. It is hard to imagine a representation
theorem that purports to prove that J is the representing quantity. Indeed,
it is hard to imagine any satisfying explanation for why the maximization of
J , specifically, should be so normatively important. And I think the same
goes for the other dependent quantities, too. I cannot prove that dependent
monists will be unable to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of
consequentialist credentials, but I regard their prospects as very dim indeed.
One might have thought that the prospects for rational pluralism are
even dimmer still, since the usual way of trying to answer the problem of
consequentialist credentials inevitably leads to rational monism. But there
is an alternative and, I think, superior way to try to answer the problem of
consequentialist credentials that does not inevitably lead to rational monism.
5 Constrained Optimization
I think consequentialists should answer the problem of consequentialist cre-
dentials in the same way they answer every problem: namely, by optimizing.
The picture I have in mind goes roughly as follows. Each quantity is
assigned a score, which measures the degree to which its maximization con-
duces to the realization of value. The rational-making quantity is then the
quantity that scores highest, subject to a guidance constraint.
As a bit of terminology, if an agent of type 〈C, u〉 faces a decision of type
〈A,K〉, then we’ll say that the agent is involved in d = 〈C, u,A,K〉. And if
an agent involved in d is capable of being guided by some quantity Q, then
we’ll say that Q is d-guiding. Rational permissions are, by their very nature,
capable of providing guidance, so the rule for reducing rational permission
maps every decision problem d to some d-guiding quantity. But subject to
this guidance constraint, we optimize, since the realization of value is all that
fundamentally matters. Hence,
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Rational Optimization: The rule for reducing rational per-
mission maps each decision problem d to the highest-scoring d-
guiding quantity.29
Rational Optimization is my proposed solution to the problem of conse-
quentialist credentials. If the rule for reducing rational permission maps d to
Q, it does so because Q is the highest-scoring d-guiding quantity: the quantity
the maximization of which best conduces to the realization of value, among
the quantities that can guide an agent involved in d. Objective permission is
a matter of unconstrained optimization—the rule for reducing objective per-
mission maps every decision problem, d, to the best quantity, namely, actual
value. Rational permission is a matter of constrained optimization—the rule
for reducing rational permission maps every decision problem, d, to the best
d-guiding quantity.
If we accept Rational Optimization, then two matters become pressing.
We want to know how to score quantities, and we want to know what it is
for a quantity to be d-guiding. My goal in the remainder of this section is to
make progress on these two matters. I offer a partial account of how to score
quantities and a full account of what it is for a quantity to be d-guiding. By
combining the two, we can shed light on the puzzling examples above.
5.1 Scoring
As I envisage it, the score of a quantity should be determined by two factors.
The first factor is the various d-scores of the quantity, where, for some decision
problem d, the d-score of Q, S(Q, d), is a measure of the degree to which
the maximization of Q conduces to the realization of value relative to d,
specifically. The second factor is some measure, M(d), assigned to each
d ∈ D. The score of a quantity is then some average of its d-scores, weighted
by the M(d)’s.
29The idea that we should be scoring quantities (or programs) and optimizing subject to
some constraint has been a mainstay of work in bounded rationality, especially in computer
science; see e.g. Halpern et al. (2014), Icard (2018), and Russell and Subramanian (1995).
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My account of how to score quantities is partial because I do not know
what the M(d)’s should be. If we put enough constraints on the space of
decision problems, then certain measures, like an indifference measure, are
tempting and plausible. But without imposing constraints on the space of
decision problems, it is hard to know what the M(d)’s should be. So I will
leave that matter undecided.
I do, however, have a proposal for how to d-score quantities. To a first
approximation, I think that the d-score of Q should be the actual value that
an agent involved in d expects to realize by choosing a Q-maximizing option.
More formally, let Max(Q,w, d) be the set of options that maximize Q
at 〈w, d〉, and let #Max(Q,w, d) be the number of options contained in
Max(Q,w, d).
Let @(a, w, d) be the actual value of option a at 〈w, d〉. For example, in
Boxes like Miners, if a is the option of choosing the right box, and w1 and
w2 are worlds at which the right box contains $10 and $0, respectively, then,
equating dollars and units of value, @(a, w1, d) = 10 and @(a, w2, d) = 0.
Let @(Q,w, d) be the average of the actual values of the Q-maximizing
options at 〈w, d〉—that is, ∑Max(Q,w,d) @(a,w,d)#Max(Q,w,d) .
I propose, then, that the d-score of Q should be the credence-weighted
average of the @(Q,w, d)’s, as determined by the credence function in d. In
other words, I propose that:
S(Q, d) =
∑
W C(w)@(Q,w, d).
One can conceive of many alternative ways to d-score quantities, and,
in a fuller discussion, it would be instructive to compare this proposal to
its rivals. But this proposal is mathematically simple, metaethically simple,
and, unlike many of its rivals,30 rightly ensures that the d-score of actual
30For example, I have not yet been able to find any (remotely plausible) way of d-
scoring quantities that (a) entails that V weakly D-dominates U and (b) does not entail
that theD-score of V sometimes exceeds the d-score of actual value. A method of d-scoring
quantities cannot be adequate unless in ensures that the d-score of actual value is never
exceeded, so this amounts to an outstanding challenge to V -enthusiasts.
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value is never exceeded.31 It therefore seems reasonable to me to explore this
proposal and see what work it can do for us.
Having (provisionally) adopted this way of d-scoring quantities, we still
cannot determine the score of any quantity, since I have not offered any
proposal about what the M(d)’s are. But I am going to assume that we
can determine some facts about how the scores of quantities relate, nev-
ertheless, by appealing to relations of weak domination. If, for some d,
S(Q1, d) > S(Q2, d), and if, for every d, S(Q1, d) ≥ S(Q2, d), then Q1 weakly
D-dominates Q2. In what follows, I assume that a quantity always scores
higher than does any quantity it weakly D-dominates.
5.2 Invariant and Supervenient Quantities
I now want to turn to guidance, building up to my preferred conception in
stages.
One necessary condition for guidance is invariance. A quantity is d-
invariant just if, for any worlds, w1 and w2,Max(Q,w1, d) =Max(Q,w2, d).
If a quantity is d-invariant, then the options that maximize it relative to d
depend only on the credences and utilities of an agent involved in d.
If quantity Q is d-invariant, let Max(Q, d) be the options that maximize
Q relative to d: that is, the options that maximize Q at each 〈w, d〉. My
proposed way to d-score quantities entails:
If Q is a d-invariant quantity, then the d-score of Q is the average
of the U -values of the options that maximize Q relative to d.
To see this, suppose that Q is d-invariant. If k is the dependency hypothesis
that holds at world w, then the actual value of option a at world w equals
u(ak). Hence,
31Proof: Let α be the quantity maximized by exactly the actual value maximizing
options at every 〈w, d〉. For any quantity Q and for any 〈w, d〉, @(α,w, d) ≥ (Q,w, d),
since the average actual value of the options that maximize actual value at 〈w, d〉 cannot
be less than the average actual value of the options that maximize Q relative to 〈w, d〉.
Hence, for any d, S(α, d) ≥ S(Q, d). Hence, S(α) ≥ S(Q).
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S(Q, d) =
∑
W C(w)@(Q,w, d) =
∑
K C(k)
∑
Max(Q,d)
u(ak)
#Max(Q,d)
=
∑
Max(Q,d)
U(a)
#Max(Q,d)
.
The fact that the d-score of a d-invariant quantity is the average of the U -
values of the options that maximize it is important because it entails that
the d-score of a d-invariant quantity never exceeds the d-score of U .
Let’s say that a quantity is supervenient if, for every d, it is d-invariant.
It is often taken for granted that options can be made rationally permissible
only by supervenient quantities. All of the quantities above—U , V , J , B, and
G—are supervenient. It is therefore remarkable that, given the assumptions
above, we can prove that U is the highest-scoring supervenient quantity.
Just by appealing to relations of weak D-domination, we can prove that
the highest-scoring supervenient quantities are only ever maximized by U -
maximizing options. And by imposing a very plausible continuity constraint
on the space of quantities, we can prove:
Supervenient Optimality: U is the highest-scoring (continu-
ous) supervenient quantity.
Both the formulation of the continuity constraint and the proof of Superve-
nient Optimality are in the appendix.
To appreciate the metaethical import of Supervenient Optimality, sup-
pose, just for a moment, that being supervenient is both necessary and suf-
ficient for being d-guiding. Then, by combining Rational Optimization and
Supervenient Optimality, we can give a metaethical derivation of U -monism.
Three metaethical claims—Rational Optimization, my proposed way to d-
score quantities, and the claim that being supervenient is both necessary
and sufficient for being d-guiding—jointly entail that the rule for reducing
rational permission maps every decision problem to U .
5.3 Guidance and Stable Maximization
I do not, myself, accept U -monism. But the attempted metaethical proof
above is helpful because it allows me to say exactly where I think U -monism
goes wrong.
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In my view, being supervenient is necessary, but not sufficient, for being
d-guiding. The attempted proof above establishes this much: that the rule
for reducing rational permission maps d to U , whenever U is d-guiding. But
it fails to establish U -monism because U is not always d-guiding.
According to the conception of guidance I favor:32
An agent facing a decision is capable of being guided by some
supervenient quantity Q just if, for some option a, the fact that
a maximizes Q can be the agent’s reason for choosing a.
And according to the conception of reasons for actions I favor:
The fact that amaximizesQ can be an agent’s reason for choosing
a just if (1) the agent is in a position to know that a maximizes
Q and (2) conditional on a, the agent (still) is in a position to
know that a maximizes Q.33
Condition (1) is an epistemic constraint ensuring that reasons are within the
agent’s ken. If we make things simple and take knowledge to be truth plus
certainty, then condition (1) says that p can be an agent’s reason for choosing
a only if, relative to the agent’s credence function, p is true and certain.
Condition (2) is a non-self-undermining constraint ensuring that agents can
choose on the basis of their reasons.34 If we again take knowledge to be truth
plus certainty, then condition (2) says that p can be an agent’s reason for
choosing a only if, relative to the agent’s credence function conditional on a,
p is true and certain.35
32A similar conception of guidance is defended in [redacted].
33Condition (2) is akin to, but not quite equivalent to, a principle that Hare (2011: 196)
calls “Reasons are not Self-Undermining.”
34See [redacted].
35Note an important distinction here. What condition (2) requires is that it be true
and certain relative to Ca that a maximizes the quantity relative to Ca, not that it be
true and certain relative to Ca that a maximizes the quantity relative to C. Thanks to
[redacted] for discussion here.
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Condition (1) is trivial for ideal agents (although, as we will see, non-
trivial for nonideal agents). So, for ideal agents, the action lies entirely with
condition (2), which is all about stability.
Say that option a stably maximizes Q relative to d = 〈C, u,A,K〉 just if
a maximizes Q both relative to d and relative to da = 〈Ca, u, A,K〉. If my
conception of guidance is correct, then guidance requires stable maximization.
An ideal agent involved in d can be guided by a supervenient quantity Q
just if some option stably maximizes Q relative to d. And since the fact
that an option maximizes a quantity can be the agent’s reason for choosing
the option only if the option stably maximizes the quantity, it is the stable
maximization, as opposed to the mere maximization, of the rational-making
quantity that makes options rationally permissible.
Putting Rational Optimization together with my preferred account of
d-guidance, we get:
Expanded Rational Optimization: What makes options ra-
tionally permissible relative to decision problem d is the stable
maximization of the highest-scoring supervenient quantity that
is stably maximized relative to d.
And with Expanded Rational Optimization in hand, we can shed some light
on the puzzling examples from above.
5.4 Why U-monism Is Nearly True
Expanded Rational Optimization entails that an agent involved in d is capa-
ble of being guided by U just if some option stably maximizes U relative to
d. This idea should sound familiar. Recall the distinction between stable and
unstable decision problems. A decision problem is stable just if, relative to
it, some option stably maximizes U . Thus, according to Expanded Rational
Optimization, an agent is capable of being guided by U just if the agent is
involved in some stable decision problem.
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At an intuitive level, this prediction about guidance seems exactly right
to me. An ideal agent facing a stable decision problem—Newcomb, say—can
be guided by U . The fact that taking both boxes (uniquely) maximizes U
can be the agent’s reason for taking both boxes. But an ideal agent facing an
unstable decision problem—The Frustrater, say—cannot be guided by U . In
an unstable decision problem, U -maximization is too elusive to be a guide.
The agent cannot both know which option she will choose and that she will
choose a U -maximizing option.
By putting Expanded Rational Optimization and Supervenient Optimal-
ity together, we can explain the importance of the division between stable
and unstable decision problems. For any decision problem d, it is the stable
maximization of the highest-scoring d-guiding quantity that makes options
rationally permissible. If d is a stable decision problem, then U is the highest-
scoring d-guiding quantity. Hence, U is the rational-maker relative to every
stable decision problem. But if d is an unstable decision problem, then U
is not d-guiding, so the rational-maker will be some quantity other than U .
Thus, U is the rational-maker relative to d if and only if d is a stable decision
problem.
So let’s turn to the next obvious question: which quantity or quantities
are the rational-makers relative to unstable decision problems?
6 U-Pluralism
The form of rational pluralism that I develop in this section is speculative,
but I think it compares favorably, in terms of theoretical simplicity, to the
dependent monisms considered in §4. And, so far as I know, it is the only
theory of rational choice on offer that can handle both Newcomb problems
and the suite of unstable problems considered herein, a suite that includes
Bostrom’s Meta-Newcomb, Egan’s Psychopath Button, and Ahmed’s Dicing
with Death. So, even if the theory proves mistaken, it still might help point
us in the right direction.
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6.1 UV -ism
As a warmup, consider, UV -ism, which says that the stable maximization of
U makes options rationally permissible relative to stable decision problems
and that the stable maximization of V makes options rationally permissible
relative to unstable decision problems.
The success of UV -ism is strange, but striking. It verifies both K-
Selection and K-Permission. It recommends two-boxing in Newcomb, the
right-handed option in The Demi-Semi-Frustrater, the envelope in The Frus-
trater, and the left-handed options in The Semi-Frustrater. (It also correctly
recommends: one-boxing in Bostrom’sMeta-Newcomb, not pressing in Egan’s
Psychopath Button, and paying to flip in Ahmed’s Dicing with Death.) And
it correctly handles Three Shells, recommending shell A if the agent is highly
confident that she will choose shell A, and recommending shells B and C if
the agent is not highly confident that she will choose shell A. Nevertheless,
I think that we should reject UV -ism, for two reasons.
The first is metaethical. Given Expanded Rational Optimization, UV -ism
is tantamount to a bold metaethical prediction: that V is the highest-scoring
quantity that can guide an agent whenever U fails to be. The presupposition
of this prediction is correct. Whenever an option maximizes V , it also stably
maximizes V . Therefore, for any decision problem d, V is d-guiding. But the
substantive claim is dubious. In fact, I think it’s false. I think that there are
cases in which the highest-scoring quantity that can guide an ideal agent is
neither U , nor V .
The second reason is related and extensional. There are cases—admittedly,
rather complicated case—that challenge UV -ism. The cases are both unsta-
ble and Newcomb-like. Here’s an example:
The Meta-Frustrater. There are two opaque boxes, one white and
one black. The agent has four options. She can point to either
box with either hand (aRW , aLW , aRB, or aLB). One of the boxes
contains $0; the other contains $100. The agent receives the con-
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tents of whichever box she points to. Which box contains which
sum depends on a prediction made yesterday by a minion who
seeks to frustrate. If the minion predicted that the agent would
point to the white box, the black box contains $100. If the min-
ion predicted that the agent would point to the black box, the
white box contains $100. There are two left-right asymmetries.
The first is straightforward. The agent receives an extra $5 if she
points to a box with her right hand. The second is more compli-
cated. There are two minions: one is a 90%-reliable predictor of
both left-handed and right-handed box-pointings, and the other
is a 50%-reliable predictor of both left-handed and right-handed
box-pointings. Which minion is up against the agent depends on
a prediction made two days ago by the Meta-Frustrater, who is a
very reliable predictor. If the Meta-Frustrater predicted that the
agent would point with her right hand, then the Meta-Frustrater
put the agent up against the minion who is 90% reliable. If the
Meta-Frustrater predicted that the agent would point with her
left hand, then the Meta-Frustrater put the agent up against the
minion who is 50% reliable. The agent knows all of this.
The similarities between The Semi-Frustrater and The Meta-Frustrater
are obvious. If the Meta-Frustrater is a (nearly) perfect predictor, then, in
the two examples, the four options have (nearly) the same V -values and U -
values.36 According to UV -ism, the examples are also normatively alike. In
36If the Meta-Frustrater is perfect, then in both examples:
V (aRW ) = V (aRB) = (105)(0.1) + (5)(0.9) = 15; and
V (aLW ) = V (aLB) = (100)(0.5) + (0)(0.5) = 50.
The U -values are sensitive to the agent’s credences over A. If, for example, C(aRW ) =
C(aRB) = C(aLW ) = C(aRW ) = 0.25, then:
U(aRW ) = U(aRB) = (105)(0.5) + (5)(0.5) = 55; and
U(aLW ) = U(aLB) = (100)(0.5) + (0)(0.5) = 50.
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both examples, UV -ism recommends the left-handed options.
Intuitions about examples this complicated are not always clear. But it
seems to me, and it has seemed to quite a number of other people, too, that
UV -ism mishandles The Meta-Frustrater : that, on account of something
Newcomb-like, the rationally permissible options in The Meta-Frustrater are
the right-handed options. In The Semi-Frustrater, the predictor who seeks
to frustrate the agent has a predictive weakness, which the agent can exploit
by pressing left-handedly. But in The Meta-Frustrater, the predictor who
seeks to frustrate the agent—whichever minion it happens to be—has no
predictive weakness to exploit. An agent who points left-handedly in The
Meta-Frustrater thus seems to be merely managing the news:37 forgoing
a certain benefit in order to produce evidence that she is up against the
predictively weaker minion.
6.2 U-pluralism
The form of rational pluralism that I favor explains why UV -ism has the
success it does, better coheres with Expanded Rational Optimization, and
correctly handles The Meta-Frustrater. I call it, U-pluralism.
Recall that U is defined in terms of K, the set of dependency hypothe-
ses. To formulate U -pluralism, I will assume that there is some privileged
way to gradually coarsen K. The set of these coarsenings, K, is linearly
ordered by granularity. The least member of K is the set of dependency hy-
potheses, to which I will append superscripted zeroes, K0 = {k01, k02, ..., k0n}.
As we gradually coarsen, we might arrive at some intermediate partition,
Kj = {kj1, kj2, ..., kjm}, and then some coarser intermediate partition, K l =
{kl1, kl2, ..., klk}. The coarsest and greatest member of K is the trivial parti-
tion, K> = {k>}, which has k> = > as its only member.
Just as U -monists can disagree about how best to conceptualize K, U -
pluralists can disagree about how best to conceptualize K.38 In the interest
37Cf. Lewis (1981).
38See e.g. Ahmed (2014a), Joyce (1999), and Lewis (1981).
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of efficiency, I will help myself to one plausible conception.
Let {lh1, lh2, ..., lhn} be the set of propositions that specify the laws of
nature and the history of the world up to the time of decision, insofar as
those matters are beyond the agent’s control. If we take {lh1, lh2, ..., lhn}
to be the set of dependency hypotheses, then the natural way to gradually
coarsen is by removing successive slices of history, producing ever shorter
initial segments, and then finally removing the laws, themselves. (This is not
the only possible conception of K,39 but it has the virtue of being easy to
work with.)
However K is characterized, it gives rise to a spectrum of supervenient
quantities, which range from U , at one extreme, to V , at the other:
U0(a) =def
∑
K0 C(k
0)V (ak0) =
∑
K0 C(k
0)u(ak0) = U(a);
...
U j(a) =def
∑
Kj C(k
j)V (akj);
...
U>(a) =def
∑
K> C(k
>)V (ak>) = V (a>) = V (a).
Let U be the set of these quantities, and let U inherit the order on K :
U i ≺ U j if and only if Ki is a refinement of Kj. Then the least member
of U is the causally finest member, namely, U . The greatest member is the
causally coarsest member, namely, V . And the intermediate members have
intermediate degrees of causal granularity and are ordered accordingly.
With U characterized, we can state U -pluralism:
U -pluralism: What makes an option rationally permissible rel-
ative to decision problem d is the stable maximization of the least
member of U that is stably maximized relative to d.
39One alternative I find attractive is purely modal. Each fact is assigned some coun-
terfactual fixity, à la Kment (2014), and we gradually coarsen by progressively removing
the facts with the least counterfactual fixity. This purely modal characterization of K is
harder to work with, but probably superior.
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To derive U -pluralism from Expanded Rational Optimization, we would
need two claims. First, we would need the claim that U is linearly ordered
by score: that every member of U scores higher than does every greater
member. Second, we would need the claim that U is exhaustive: that the
rule for reducing rational permission maps every decision problem to some
member of U .
The first claim is supported by a computer simulation. As I said above,
with enough constraints on the space of decision problems, it can be plausible
to use an indifference measure to average the d-scores of a quantity. In the
simulation run, I did precisely that. The simulation involved 16 dependency
hypotheses and four options. For each cycle, probabilities and utilities (be-
tween 0 and 100) were randomly distributed over the 64 atoms in A × K.
Since there are 16 dependency hypotheses, there are five members of U :
U0 = U , U1, U2, U3, and U> = V . Each quantity in U is supervenient, and
the d-score of a supervenient quantity is the average U -value of the options
that maximize the quantity relative to d, so, in each cycle of the simulation,
for each U i ∈ U , I recorded the U -value of the U i-maximizing option. After
running the simulation 15,000 times, the following curve emerged:
Normalizing the average d-score of U to 1, the average d-scores of U1, U2, U3,
and U> were, respectively, .9778, .9685, .9651, and .9642. Now, of course,
this does not prove that each member of U is higher-scoring than every
greater member, but it does lend considerable support to that claim.
The second claim is speculative, but more plausible in light of the first.
We know that the rule for reducing rational permission maps every stable
decision problem to U . And since V is d-guiding for every decision problem d,
we know that the rule for reducing rational permission never maps a decision
problem to a quantity that scores lower than V . Therefore, if the first claim
is true—if U is linearly ordered by score—then the second claim is plausible,
although not by any means obvious or trivial.
One important virtue of U -pluralism is that it delivers the recommen-
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dations we seek. It verifies both K-Selection and K-Permission. It recom-
mends two-boxing in Newcomb, the right-handed option in The Demi-Semi-
Frustrater, the envelope in The Frustrater, and the left-handed options in The
Semi-Frustrater. (It recommends: one-boxing in Bostrom’s Meta-Newcomb,
not pressing in Egan’s Psychopath Button, and paying to flip in Ahmed’s
Dicing with Death.) It correctly handles Three Shells, recommending shell A
if the agent is highly confident that she will choose shell A, and recommend-
ing shells B and C if the agent is not highly confident that she will choose
shell A. And it also correctly handles The Meta-Frustrater, recommending
the right-handed options.
I will not go through all of the relevant calculations. But let me go
through two cases, The Frustrater and The Meta-Frustrater.
To make things simple, suppose that the agent facing The Frustrater
is certain that the Frustrater’s prediction was made instantaneously j units
prior to the time of decision. (This assumption merely vivifies the metaethical
structure.40) Let the kj’s be propositions that specify the laws of nature and
the history of the world up to j units prior to the time of decision, and let
U j be defined in terms of Kj. As we work our way through the members of
U, from least to greatest, we encounter a metaethical shift.
40Assuming that the agent is certain that the prediction was made instantaneously j
units prior to the time of decision makes the metaethical transition sudden. For every
U i ≺ U j , U i(aA) + U i(aB) = 100. And, for every Uk  U j , Uk(aA) + Uk(aB) ≈ 0. If
we drop the assumption that the agent is certain that the prediction was made j units
prior to the time of decision, the metaethical transition might instead be gradual. If
the decrease is gradual, then emphasizing stable maximization might be important. In
a version of The Frustrater in which the agent is uncertain when the prediction was
made, it may be the case that the least member of U that is stably maximized, say,
U j , is maximized both by, say, aA and aE . This sort of co-maximization would not
make aA rationally permissible, however, because aA will not stably maximize U j . In
fact, neither aA, nor aB stably maximize any member of U. If aA maximizes some U j ,
then
∑
C(kj |aA)u(aAkj) <
∑
C(kj |aa)u(aBkj), since the agent then will regard aA as
evidence in favor of aB-friendly kjs. But the co-maximization would make aE rationally
permissible, since aE stably maximizes the least member of U that is stably maximized,
whatever that proves to be.
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If U i ≺ U j—in other words, if Ki is any refinement of Kj—then, de-
pending on the agent’s credences, aA and/or aB maximizes U i, but no option
stably maximizes U i. Each ki specifies how much money is in each box. As
a result, for any ki, V (aEki) = 40 and V (aaki) + V (abki) = 100. Hence,
U i(aE) = 40 and U i(aA) + U i(aB) = 100. But no option stably maximizes
U i because the agent regards choosing a box as strong evidence that the box
is empty:
∑
Ki C(k
i|aA)V (aAki) < ∑Ki C(ki|aA)V (aBki), and∑
Ki C(k
i|aB)V (aBki) < ∑Ki C(ki|aB)V (aAki).
By contrast, if U j  Uk, then taking the envelope stably maximizes
Uk. No kk specifies how much money is in each box. As a result, V (aAkk),
V (aBk
k), and V (aEkk) are determined by what kk says about the Frustrater’s
reliability. If the agent is certain that the Frustrater is almost perfectly
reliable, then, for any kk, V (aEkk) = 40 and V (aAkk) = V (aBkk) ≈ 0. Hence,
Uk(aEk
k) = 40 and Uk(aAkk) = Uk(aBkk) ≈ 0. And choosing the envelope
also stably maximizes Uk. Indeed, if the agent has no uncertainty about
the Frustrater’s predictive powers, then, for any kk, C(kk|aA) = C(kk|aB) =
C(kk|aE). Thus, according to U -pluralism, an agent facing The Frustrater
is rationally required to choose the envelope, and is so because choosing the
envelope is the only option that stably maximizes the least member of U
that is stably maximized, namely, U j.
When we see how U -pluralism handles The Frustrater, we can understand
why UV -ism has success.
Think about stable decision problems. What makes options rationally
permissible relative to a stable decision problem is the stable maximization
of U . But in the simplest stable decision problems, V -maximization and U -
maximization coincide. Thus, although V -monism is mistaken metaethically,
it very often delivers the correct recommendations. The only stable decision
problems in which V -monism gives the wrong recommendations are Newcomb
problems.
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A similar thing holds true of unstable decision problems. What makes
options rationally permissible relative to an unstable decision problem is the
stable maximization of the least member of U that is stably maximized. But
in the simplest unstable decision problems, V -maximization coincides with
the maximization of the least member of U that is stably maximized. Thus,
although UV -ism is mistaken metaethically, it very often delivers the right
recommendations. The only unstable decision problems in which UV -ism
delivers the wrong recommendations are unstable Newcomb problems, like
The Meta-Frustrater.
Let’s now consider The Meta-Frustrater. To make things simple, suppose
that the agent is certain that the Meta-Frustrater’s prediction was made
instantaneously l units of time prior to the decision, and that the agent is
certain that the minion, whichever one the agent is up against, made their
prediction instantaneously j units of time prior to the decision, j < l. (Again,
these assumptions merely serve to vivify the metaethical structure.41) Let
each kl specify the laws and the history of the world up to l units prior to the
decision; let each kj specify the laws and history up to j units prior to the
decision; and let U l and U j be defined in terms of K l and Kj, respectively.
As we work our way through the members of U , from least to greatest, we
encounter two metaethical shifts.
If U i ≺ U j, then, depending on the agent’s credences, aRW and/or aLW
maximize U i, but no option stably maximizes U i. Each ki specifies which
box contains $100. As a result, for any ki:
V (aRWk
i) = 5 + V (aLWk
i);
41There is one added complication. As [redacted] pointed out to me, according to U -
pluralism as formulated, it is essential that the Meta-Frustrater makes his prediction before
the minions do. If the minions make their prediction first, then the options that stably
maximize the least member of U that is stably maximized will be the left-handed options.
I am not sure whether this prediction is wrong. (Flipping the temporal order makes my
intuitions less clear.) But, when I am inclined to think that flipping the temporal order
makes no normative difference, I am inclined, not to abandon U -pluralism, but to adopt
an alternative conception of K. See note 39.
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V (aRBk
i) = 5 + V (aLBk
i); and
V (aRWk
i) + V (aRBk
i) = 110.
This ensures that choosing aRW and/or aRB maximize U i. But no option
stably maximizes U i because the agent regards pointing right-handedly to a
box as strong evidence that the box is empty:
∑
Ki C(k
i|aRW )V (aRWki) < ∑Ki C(ki|aRW )V (aRBki), and∑
Ki C(k
i|aRB)V (aRBki) < ∑Ki C(ki|aRB)V (aRWki).
By contrast, if U j  Uk and Uk ≺ U l, then the two right-handed options
both stably maximize Uk. The kk’s do not specify which box contains $100,
but they do specify which minion the agent is up against. If kk says that the
agent is up against the 50% reliable minion, then:
V (aRWk
k) = V (aRBk
k) = (0.5)(105) + (0.5)(5) = 55, and
V (aLWk
k) = V (aLBk
k) = (0.5)(100) + (0.5)(0) = 50.
If kk says that the agent is up against the 90% reliable minion, then:
V (aRWk
k) = V (aRBk
k) = (0.1)(105) + (0.8)(5) = 15, and
V (aLWk
k) = V (aLBk
k) = (0.1)(100) + (0.9)(0) = 10.
Hence, no matter how the agent distributes her credence over Kk, the two
right-handed options maximize Uk.
The Newcomb-like phenomenon in The Meta-Frustrater is thus made ap-
parent. In Newcomb, taking both boxes stably maximizes U , even though the
agent regards taking both boxes as bad news, and this is because, no matter
how the agent distributes her credence over K, taking both boxes maximizes
U . In The Meta-Frustrater, for any Uk, U j  Uk ≺ U l, the two right-handed
options stably maximize Uk, even though the agent regards the right-handed
options as bad news, and this is because, no matter how the agent distributes
her credence over Kk, the two right-handed options maximize Uk.
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Now, if we continue working through the members of U, from least to
greatest, we will encounter another metaethical shift. If U l ≺ Um, then
the two left-handed options stably maximize Um. This is because the km’s
specify neither which box contains $100, nor which minion the agent is up
against. Thus, as we know, the two left-handed options maximize V .
But the quantities stably maximized by the left-handed options are metaeth-
ically irrelevant. What makes options rationally permissible in The Meta-
Frustrater is the stable maximization of U j, the least member of U that is
stably maximized. So the rationally permissible options are the right-handed
options
Now, as I said, U -pluralism is speculative. But it has at least three
things going for it. One: it coheres nicely with Expanded Rational Opti-
mization. Two: it is, so far as I know, the only theory on offer that can
handle both Newcomb problems and the full suite of unstable problems con-
sidered herein. And three: it is metaethically conservative. According to
U -pluralism, expected value theory is nearly true! The stable maximization
of U , i.e., expected value, is almost always what makes options rationally
permissible. The other members of U, and the additional complications that
they bring in tow, are relevant only when we turn our attention to highly
unusual cases.
7 Conclusion
An adequate consequentialist reduction of objective permission must involve
both an identifying element and an explanatory element. For each decision
problem d, we need to identify the quantity that is the objective-maker rel-
ative to d, and we need to explain why that quantity is the objective-maker
relative to d. As it turns out, both elements are easy. Actual value is the
universal objective-maker, and it is so because it is the best quantity to
maximize.
An adequate consequentialist reduction of rational permission likewise
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must involve both an identifying element and an explanatory element. For
each decision problem d, we need to identify the quantity that is the rational-
maker relative to d, and we need to explain why that quantity is the rational-
maker relative to d. But both elements here are more difficult.
The identifying element is more difficult because there’s not just one
answer. Many who work on rational choice are searching for the universal
rational-maker. But, if I’m right, then rational monism is false: there is
no universal rational-maker. And that fact makes the explanatory element
more difficult, too; for the usual ways of trying to explain why a quantity
is a rational-maker presuppose and require that the quantity be a universal
rational-maker. There is no received theory of occasional rational-making.
The positive part of this essay began with me offering a theory of occa-
sional rational-making. I suggested that what makes a quantity a rational-
maker relative to decision problem d is being the best quantity to maximize,
among the quantities that can guide an agent involved in d. Stated in this
way, the proposal is skeletal. But I tried to put some meat on the bones by
offering a partial account of how to score quantities and an account of what
it is for a quantity to be d-guiding.
When the theory of occasional rational-making is fleshed out in the ways
I prefer, it predicts that U is the rational-maker relative to all and only the
stable decision problems. To my mind, this brings some needed clarity to
the theory of rational choice for ideal agents; for it allows us to reconcile the
pro-U intuitions in Newcomb problems with the anti-U intuitions in unstable
problems.
But the real value of rational pluralism and the theory of occasional
rational-making that gives rise to it become apparent only when we zoom
out and consider nonideal agents.
Rational monism, defended in full generality, is very doubtful because we
can minerize virtually any quantity, constructing a case that stands to it
as Boxes like Miners stands to actual value. For example, I am convinced
that what makes choosing the middle box rationally permissible in Boxes like
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Miners is the (stable) maximization of U , and the following case, in which
there is nonideal agent with unlimited of powers of introspection but limited
powers of deduction, minerizes U :42
The Fire. The fire alarm rings and the agent, a firefighter, hurries
onto the truck. On the ride over she deliberates. There are three
doors into the building, arranged left-to-right. The agent, who
cares only about saving lives, must enter the building via one of
the three doors. Since she does not know the exact distribution
of residents in the building, she does not know which option will
result in the most rescues. Based on her credences about the
distribution of residents, she calculates the U -value of each option
and writes the value on a note card. After exiting the truck and
attaching the water hose, she races toward the burning building.
She reaches into her pocket, but the note card is gone. Time
is of the essence! She knows that all of the residents will die
in the time it would take her to recalculate the U -values of the
options. She knows that the current U -values of the options are
what they were when she calculated them, since she knows that
her credences about the distribution of residents are unchanged.
But she cannot fully remember the results of her calculations.
She remembers that the U -value of entering through the middle
door is 9. Of the other two options, she remembers that one
has an U -value of 0 and that the other has an U -value of 10.
But she cannot remember which option has which U -value, and
divides her credence equally between the two possibilities. (In
fact, entering through the right door has an U -value of 10, as the
lost note card attests.)
The agent facing The Fire is rationally required to enter via the middle
door, even though she knows for certain that doing so does not maximize
42This example, from [redacted], adapts an example from Kagan (2018). For related
discussion, see e.g. Feldman (2006) and Weirich (2004).
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U . Therefore, if the maximization of U is what makes options rationally
permissible in Boxes like Miners, rational monism, as applied to both ideal
and nonideal agents, stands refuted. And notice that we can replace U with
any minerizable quantity. Rational monism, defended in full generality, is
hopeless if the quantity at its center is minerizable.
Like others who have discussed structurally similar cases,43 I think that,
in The Fire, options are made rationally permissible by maximizing U2, where
the U2-value of option a is the agent’s expectation of its U -value—that is,∑
v C([U(a) = v])v. The U2-value of entering through the middle door is 9,
and the U2-values of entering through the left door and entering through the
right door both are 5.
But if the maximization of U2 is what makes options rationally permis-
sible in The Fire, then we need to explain why it is the maximization of
U2, specifically, and not some other quantity, that makes options rationally
permissible. And the constrained optimization approach is appealing. The
firefighter is not capable of being guided by U . Condition (1) fails: the fire-
fighter, on account of her limited powers of deduction, is not in a position
to know that entering through the right door (uniquely) maximizes U . But
the firefighter is capable of being guided by U2. And it’s tempting to think
that what sets U2 apart from the other quantities that can guide the fire-
fighter, what makes U2 the occasional rational-maker, is its status as being
the best quantity that can guide the firefighter, i.e., the quantity that best
conduces to the realization of value, among the quantities that can guide the
firefighter.44
In this essay I have focused almost exclusively on ideal agents because
43See e.g. [redacted] and Weirich (2004).
44Much work on bounded rationality is similarly animated by a constrained optimization
conception of rationality. See e.g. Bossaerts and Murawksi (2017), Gigerenzer (2008),
Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), Griffiths et al. (2015), Griffiths and Tenebaum (2006),
Halpern et al. (2014), Icard (2018), Lokowski and Kreinovich (2018), Paul and Quiggin
(2018), Russell and Subramanian (1995), Simon (1956; 1957; 1983), Vul et al. (2014), and
Weirich (1988; 2004).
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nonideal agents are hard to model with mathematical precision. But con-
sequentialists ultimately need a reduction of rational permission that holds
true for all agents, ideal and nonideal. And I think that rational pluralism
and the theory of occasional rational-making that gives rise to it are worthy
of further exploration because I think that they may help unify the theory
of rational choice for ideal agents and the theory of rational choice for non-
ideal agents, thus helping pave the way for a fully general consequentialist
reduction of rational permission.45
A Proof of Supervenient Optimality
The proof of Supervenient Optimality has two parts. First, we show
that U weakly D-dominates any supervenient quantity that diverges from
U . Then we show that any quantity that is distinct from U , but does not
diverge from U , violates a plausible continuity constraint.
IfMax(Q,w, d) 6⊂Max(U,w, d) for any point 〈w, d〉, I will say that there
is a point of divergence between Q and U . If Q is supervenient and there is a
point of divergence between Q and U , then U weakly D-dominates Q. After
all, suppose that 〈w, d〉 is a point of divergence between Q and U . Since Q
and U are both supervenient, the d-score of Q is the average of the U -values
of the options in Max(Q,w, d), and the d-score of U is the average of the
U -values of the options inMax(U,w, d). Hence, since at least one member of
Max(Q,w, d) fails to maximize U relative to d, the average of the U -values of
the options in Max(Q,w, d) is strictly less than the average of the U -values
of the options in Max(U,w, d). Hence, S(Q, d) < S(U, d). Moreover, if Q
is supervenient, then, for any d, S(Q, d) ≤ S(U, d). So it follows that U
weakly D-dominates Q. And given my assumption that the ordinal rankings
of quantities respect relations of weak D-domination, it follows that U scores
higher than does Q.
The supervenient quantities that are distinct from U , but score as highly
45[Acknowledgements].
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as U , are subset quantities : quantities that are always maximized by U -
maximizing options, but not always maximized by every U -maximizing op-
tion. (Think, for example, about the quantity that corresponds to being the
leftmost U -maximizing option.) But subset quantities violate an intuitively
plausible continuity constraint. If u is a utility function, and u(w) = x,
then let uw, and uw,− be utility functions that are exactly like u, except
that uw,(w) = x +  and uw,−(w) = x − . If d = 〈C, u,A,K〉, then let
dw, = 〈C, uw,, A,K〉 and let dw,− = 〈C, uw,−, A,K〉. The relevant continu-
ity constraint then can be stated as follows:
Utility Continuity. If a /∈ Max(Q,w, d), then, for any world
wi there is some  such that a /∈ Max(Q,w, dwi,) and a /∈
Max(Q,w, dwi,−).
In effect, Utility Continuity says that small changes to utilities assigned to
any particular world should precipitate only small changes in the values that
a quantity assigns to options.
To see that every subset quantity violates Utility Continuity, suppose
that Q is a subset quantity, and suppose that a is among the options that
maximize U at 〈w, d〉, but not among the options that maximize Q at 〈w, d〉.
There will then be some a-world, wi, to which the credence function in d
assigns nonzero probability, which is such that, increasing its utility, while
keeping the utility of every other world the same, increases the U -value of
a, but does not increase the U -value of any other option in A. So, for any
, a uniquely maximizes U at 〈w, dwi,〉. Since Q is a subset quantity, a also
uniquely maximizes Q at 〈w, dwi,〉. But that shows that Q violates Utility
Continuity.
Thus, Supervenient Optimality holds: U is the highest-scoring superve-
nient quantity that satisfies Utility Continuity.
References
[1] [redacted]
41
[2] Arif Ahmed. 2012. “Press the Button.” Philosophy of Science 79: 386–95.
[3] ——. 2014a. Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University
Press.
[4] ——. 2014b. “Dicing with Death.” Analysis 74: 587–94.
[5] ——. 2018. “Why Ain’cha Rich?" In A. Ahmed (ed.) Newcomb’s Problem.
Cambridge University Press.
[6] Frank Arntzenius. 2008. “No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision
Theory.” Erkenntnis 68: 277–97.
[7] Adam Bales. 2018. “Decision-Theoretic Pluralism.” Philosophical Quar-
terly 68: 801–18.
[8] Robert Bassett. 2015. “A Critique of Benchmark Theory.” Synthese 192:
241–67.
[9] Jeremy Bentham. 1961[1789]. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation. Garden City: Doubleday.
[10] José Luis Bermúdez. 2009. Decision Theory and Rationality. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
[11] Ethan D. Bolker. 1967. “A Simultaneous Axiomatisation of Utility and
Subjective Probability.” Philosophy of Science 34: 333–40.
[12] Peter Bossaerts and Carsten Murawski. 2017. “Computational Compex-
tity and Human Decision-Making.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21: 917–
29.
[13] Nick Bostrom. 2001. “The Meta-Newcomb Problem.” Analysis 61: 309–
10.
[14] R. A. Briggs. 2010. “Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes.”
Philosophical Review 119: 1–30.
42
[15] Lara Buchak. 2013. Risk and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
[16] Ellery Eells. 1982. Rational Decision and Causality. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
[17] Ellery Eells and William Harper. 1991. “Ratifiability, Game Theory,
and the Principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 69: 1–19.
[18] Andy Egan. 2007. “Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory.”
Philosophical Review 116: 94–114.
[19] Lina Eriksson and Alan Háyek. 2007. “What Are Degrees of Belief?”
Studia Logica 86: 183–213.
[20] Fred Feldman. 2006. “Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality,
and the Move to Expected Utility.” Philosophical Studies 129: 49–79.
[21] J. Dmitri Gallow. MS. “The Causal Decision Theorist’s Guide to Man-
aging the News.”
[22] Allan Gibbard and William Harper. 1978. “Counterfactuals and Two
Kinds of Expected Utility.” In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach, and E. F. McClennen
(eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, 125–62. Reidel.
[23] Gerd Gigerenzer. 2008. Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with
Uncertainty. Oxford University Press.
[24] Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds). 2001. Bounded Rationality:
The Adaptive Toolkit. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[25] Thomas L. Griffiths, Falk Lieder, and Noah D. Goodman. 2015. “Ratio-
nal Use of Cognitive Resources: Levels of Analysis Between the Compu-
tational and Algorithmic.” Topics in Cognitive Science 7: 217–29.
[26] Thomas L. Griffiths and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. 2006. “Optimal Predic-
tions in Everyday Cognition.” Psychological Science 17: 767–73.
43
[27] Johan Gustafsson. 2011. “A Note in Defense of Ratificationism.” Erken-
ntnis 75: 147–50.
[28] Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, and Lior Seeman. 2014. “Decision The-
ory with Resource-Bounded Agents,” Topics in Cognitive Science 6: 245–
57.
[29] Peter J. Hammond. 1988. “Consequentialist Foundations for Expected
Utility Theory.” Theory and Decision 25: 25–78.
[30] Caspar Hare. 2011. “Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the
Matter About What Would Have Happened if You Had not Done What
You Did.” Noûs 45: 190–206.
[31] Caspar Hare and Brian Hedden. 2016. “Self-Reinforcing and Self-
Frustrating Decisions.” Noûs 50: 604–28.
[32] William Harper. 1986. “Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal De-
cision Theory.” Erkenntnis 24: 25–36.
[33] Terrence Horgan. 1981. “Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s Problem.”
Journal of Philosophy 78: 331–56.
[34] Daniel Hunter and Reed Richter. 1978. “Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s
Paradox.” Synthese 39: 249–61.
[35] Thomas Icard. 2018. “Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis.” Philoso-
phy of Science 85: 79–101.
[36] Richard Jeffrey. 1965. The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago
Press.
[37] ——. 1983. The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press.
[38] James Joyce. 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cam-
bridge University Press.
44
[39] ——. 2012. “Regret and Stability in Causal Decision Theory.” Synthese
187: 123–45.
[40] ——. 2018. “Deliberation and Stability in Newcomb Problems and
Psuedo-Newcomb Problems.” In A. Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb’s Problem. Ox-
ford University Press.
[41] Shelly Kagan. 2018 “The Paradox of Methods.” Politics, Philosophy, and
Economics 17: 148–68.
[42] Boris Kment. 2014. Modality and Explanatory Reasoning. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
[43] Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane. 2010. “Ifs and Oughts.” Journal of
Philosophy 107: 115–43.
[44] David Lewis. 1981. “Causal Decision Theory.” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 59: 5–30.
[45] Christian List and Franz Dietrich. 2016. “Mentalism Versus Behavior-
ism in Economics: a Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.” Economics and
Philosophy 32: 249–81.
[46] Joe Lorkowski and Vladik Kreinovich. 2018. Bounded Rationality in De-
cision Uncertainty: Towards Optimal Granularity. Springer.
[47] Christopher J. G. Meacham and Jonathan Weisberg. 2011. “Represen-
tation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory.” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 89: 641–63.
[48] John Stuart Mill. 1988[1861]. Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.). Oxford
University Press.
[49] G. E. Moore. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
[50] ——. 1912. Ethics. Oxford University Press.
45
[51] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.
[52] Robert Nozick. 1969. “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of
Choice.” In N. Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl. G. Hempel, 114–46.
Reidel.
[53] Graham Oddie and Peter Menzies. 1992. “An Objectivist’s Guide to
Subjective Value.” Ethics 102: 512–33.
[54] L. A. Paul and John Quiggin. 2018. “Real World Problems.” Episteme
15: 363–82.
[55] Richard Pettigrew. 2015. “Risk, Rationality, and Expected Utility The-
ory.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47: 798–826.
[56] ——. 2019. Choosing for Changing Selves. Oxford University Press.
[57] Wlodek Rabinowicz. 1988. “Ratifiability and Stability.” In P. Gärdenfors
and N. Sahlin (eds.), Decision, Probability, and Utility, 406–25. Cambridge
University Press.
[58] ——. 1989. “Stable and Retrievable Options.” Philosophy of Science 56:
624–41.
[59] Frank P. Ramsey. 1990[1926]. “Truth and Probability.” In D. H. Mellor
(ed.), Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.
[60] John Rawls. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
[61] Pamela Robinson. Dissertation. “Toward an Ultimate Normative The-
ory.”
[62] Stuart J. Russell and Devika Subramanian. 1995. “Provably Bounded-
Optimal Agents.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 2: 575-609.
[63] Leonard J. Savage. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley.
46
[64] Amartya Sen. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Holden-Day.
[65] Herbert A. Simon. 1956. “Rational Choice and the Structure of the En-
vironment.” Psychological Review 63: 129–38.
[66] ——. 1957. Models of Man. Wiley.
[67] ——. 1983. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford University Press.
[68] Brian Skyrms. 1982. “Causal Decision Theory.” Journal of Philosophy
79: 695–711.
[69] ——. 1984. Pragmatics and Empiricism. Yale University Press.
[70] ——. 1990. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Harvard University
Press.
[71] J. Howard Sobel. 1994. Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice.
Cambridge University Press.
[72] Robert Stalnaker. 1981. “Letter to David Lewis of 21 May 1972.” In
Stalnaker, Harper, and Pearce (eds.), Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision,
Chance and Time, 151–53. Reidel.
[73] Judith Jarvis Thomson. 2008. Normativity. Open Court.
[74] Edward Vul, Noah D. Goodman, Thomas L. Griffiths, and Joshua B.
Tenenbaum. 2014. “One and Done? Optimal Decisions from Very Few
Samples.” Cognitive Science. 38: 599-637.
[75] Ralph Wedgwood. 2013. “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem.”
Synthese 190: 2643–75.
[76] Paul Weirich. 1985. “Decision Instability.” Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 63: 465–72.
[77] ——. 1988. “Hierarchical Maximization of Two Kinds of Expected Util-
ity. Philosophy of Science 55: 560–82.
47
[78] ——. 2004. Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in
Nonideal Circumstances. Oxford University Press.
[79] Ian Wells. Forthcoming. “Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.”
Mind.
48
